Sacred Vote — voting you can actually verify
A voting platform built on the premise that a result nobody can check is not a result.
Visit sacredvote
Secrecy and verifiability pull against each other: a voter must be able to confirm their ballot was counted, without ever being able to prove to anyone else how they voted.
Why that tension is the whole problem
If a voter can prove how they voted, their vote can be bought or coerced — so a receipt is not a feature, it is a vulnerability. But if they cannot check anything at all, they are asked to trust the people running the election. Verifiable voting schemes exist to give the first guarantee without giving up the second.
What a voter can check
- 1
The ballot was recorded
Each encrypted ballot is published to a public board, and the voter can find theirs on it.
- 2
The recorded ballots were the ones counted
The tally is computed over the published board, so anyone can recount it independently.
- 3
The count was done correctly
Decryption produces a proof that the result matches the ballots, without decrypting any single one.
The work builds on Belenios, an established scheme with published security proofs, and extends it toward post-quantum primitives. Building on a reviewed design rather than inventing one is the entire point: cryptography that has not been attacked by other people is not yet known to be strong.